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The Piedmont Case and Restrictive Zoning
PAUL BRINDEL
O N OCTOBER 27, 1955, the Supreme Court of California decided
what may well be the most important case on private education
to come before the courts in recent years-Roman Catholic Welfare
Corp. v. City of Piedmont.' By the narrow margin of 4 to 3, the court
held a city zoning ordinance which prohibited private schools while
permitting the erection of public schools to be "unconstitutional and
void because of its arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against
private schools." '2
Two earlier cases, one distinguished and one contradicted by the
instant opinion, had demonstrated an undue extension of the restrictive
power of zoning ordinances. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. City
of Porterville,3 decided in 1949, Mormons sought a court order to
compel the issuance of a building permit for a church. A local zoning
ordinance excluded all churches from the single family residential dis-
trict in which the plaintiff owned land. At the time the property was
acquired, it was located partly without the city limits. It was later
included within the city limits in an area limited in its use to single
family dwelling units. The District Court of Appeals of California
held that:
... [S]ince the city had power to zone the property herein affected,
strictly for single family dwellings, there was no abuse of the power in pro-
hibiting the erection and construction of church buildings therein. It is
a matter of common knowledge that people in considerable numbers
assemble in churches and that parking and traffic problems exist where
crowds gather .... There necessarily is an appreciable amount of noise
I -Cal. 2d -, 289 P. 2d 438 (1955). See also I CATHOLIC LAWYER 64 (Jan. 1955);
1 id. at 153 (April 1955); 1id. at 254 (July 1955); 1 id. at 340 (Oct. 1955); 2 id.
at 83 (Jan. 1956).
2 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, supra note 1 at 443.
3 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P. 2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U. S. 805
(1949) (per curiam).
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connected with the conduct of church and
"youth activities." These and many other
factors may well enter into the determina-
tion of the legislative body.in drawing the
lines between districts, a determination pri-
marily the province of the city. 4
The court reasoned that the plaintiff was
not a congregation; that it merely held
property as a corporation sole; that having
such right from the state and being de-
pendent upon the state for its existence, the
enjoyment of the property was subject to
"reasonable regulations." In concluding
that the complaint was legally insufficient,
the court further found:
Plaintiff's contention in the trial court was
as stated in his reply brief-"That the pro-
hibition of churches in virtually all residen-
tial zones is on its face not a proper exercise
of the police power, and that it violates the
constitutional immunity of freedom of re-
ligious worship."
Where, as here, plaintiff elected to stand
on the allegations of the petition, and de-
clined to amend it, informing the court that
amendment would be "futile," it cannot be
held that there was an abuse of discretion
in the ruling of the trial court [dismissing
the plaintiff's petition]. 5
It is interesting to note that after
the California Supreme Court denied the
petitioner a hearing, the Supreme Court of
the United States also denied a hearing "for
want of a substantial federal question."' 6
Prior to the Porterville decision the cases
were in accord that churches could not be
excluded from residential zones, with little
attention being given to possible congestion
4 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. City of
Porterville, 203 P. 2d 823, 825 (1949).
5 Id. at 826.
6 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. City of
Porterville, 338 U. S. 805 (1949) (per curiam).
or traffic hazards. 7 The effect of the de-
cision is illustrated by the fact that the
Porterville case, despite its faulty reason-
ing, was found to be a "complete answer"
to the contentions of a Baptist church in a
similar case decided two years later.8
The second adverse zoning decision to
be noted is State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran
High School Conference v. Sinar.9 There, a
building permit for a high school was
sought by Lutherans in Wauwatosa, Wis-
consin. A zoning ordinance permitted pub-
lic high schools in a residential district but
private high schools were banned. The
plaintiff brought mandamus to compel the
issuance of a permit, alleging that the or-
dinance deprived it of property without due
process of law and denied it equal pro-
tection of the laws. The Circuit Court
granted the writ. In a 5 to 2 decision, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the
lower court, holding that the distinction
drawn between private and public high
schools was not arbitrary and unreasonable.
The court reasoned that:
The public school has the same features
objectionable to the surrounding area as a
private one, but it has, also, a virtue which
the other lacks, namely that it is located to
serve and does serve the area without dis-
crimination. Whether the private school is
sectarian or commercial, though it now
complains of discrimination, in its services
it discriminates and the public school does
not. Anyone in the district of fit age and
educational qualifications may attend the
public high school. It is his right. He has no
7 See Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1287 (1942).
8 City of Chico v. First Avenue Baptist Church,
108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P. 2d 587 (1951).
9 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W. 2d 43 (1954), appeal
dismissed, 349 U. S. 913 (1955) (per curiam).
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comparable right to attend a private school.
To go there he must meet additional stand-
ards over which the public neither has nor
should have control. The private school im-
poses on the community all the disadvan-
tages of the public school but does not
compensate the community in the same
manner or to the same extent. 10
This decision was similar to the Porter-
ville case in several respects. In both cases
the courts went against the weight o f author-
ity," in both the validity of the court's rea-
soning was open to serious question, and
on each occasion the United States Supreme
Court refused to review the decision on the
ground that no substantial federal question
was involved. 12
It was against this background that the
California Supreme Court entertained a
mandamus proceeding to compel the issu-
ance of a building permit for an elementary
parochial school in Piedmont, a San Fran-
cisco suburb. Piedmont's zoning laws ex-
cluded private schools from Zone A, which
embraces 98.7 percent of the city's 1152
acres. The Church and the adjoining school
site in question were in Zone A. In the
remaining 1.3 percent of Piedmont's area
there was no vacant land of sufficient size
to accommodate a school. In the Arch-
diocese of San Francisco, school property
is held separately by the Roman Catholic
Welfare Corporation of San Francisco. Ac-
cordingly, it was this corporation which
sought and was refused a building permit.
The District Court of Appeals, in a unani-
10 State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School
Conference v. Sinar, 65 N.W. 2d 43, 47 (1954).
11 See 1 YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE,
§57, at 89 (2d ed. 1953); Annot., 138 A.L.R.
1287 (1942).
12 See notes 6 and 9, supra.
mous decision, ordered the city to issue the
permit. 13
In affirming the District Court's deci-
sion, 14 the California Supreme Court reas-
serted the principle laid down in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters 5 that:
The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.' 6
However, the court went further and de-
clared that "parents have the right to send
their children to private schools, rather
than public ones, which are located in their
immediate locality or general neighbor-
hood."' 17 In reaching its conclusion, the
court discounted arguments based on the
fact that the city has no power to regulate
or exclude public schools. It also rejected
the distinction drawn between private and
public schools in the Wisconsin Lutheran
High School case, holding that it was "dif-
ficult to make an argument that private
schools are inimical to the public welfare
while public schools are not."18
The only disconcerting factor in the
majority opinion was the apparent recogni-
tion of the principle laid down in the Porter-
ville case. The majority held the Porterville
decision to be inapplicable to the present
facts, since the former involved total ex-
clusion whereas the instant case turned on
13 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Pied-
mont, 278 P. 2d 943 (1955).
14 -Cal. 2d -, 289 P. 2d 438 (1955).
15 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
16 Id. at 535.
17 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Pied-
mont, 289 P. 2d 438, 441 (1955).
I8Id. at 442.
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the question of discrimination. This may
have been a tacit approval of the Porter-
ville doctrine that churches may be totally
excluded from a residential zone.
The importance of the foregoing deci-
sions can best be appreciated in the light
of current suburban growth. Scores of
suburbs have sprung up as a result of the
housing boom after World War II. Each
year more and more of the new suburbs
are being incorporated as villages, towns
and cities. As this transition takes place,
zoning regulations are formulated. To pre-
vent a recurrence of the events which took
place in Porterville, Piedmont and Wau-
As THE CATHOLIC LAWYER went to
press, the New York Court of Appeals an-
nounced its decision in two significant zon-
ing cases; Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Board of Town of Brighton and Matter of
Community Synagogue v. Bates.
In the Rochester case the Court held that
a zoning board's refusal to issue petitioners
a permit for the construction of a church and
school was arbitrary and unreasonable. In
so doing the Court discounted the board's
objections that the construction would
change the character of the residential use
and enjoyment of the area, that property
values would suffer, and that there would
be a loss of tax revenue. The majority
opinion expressly refrained from deciding
any question as to the constitutionality of
the ordinance itself but limited the holding
watosa, an active interest should be taken
by laymen in the formulation of local zon-
ing ordinances. In addition, strong public
opinion should be aroused and brought to
bear when such cases are litigated in the
courts.
The favorable decision in the Piedmont
case illustrates what can be achieved
through the united action of all denomina-
tions. Tfere, eleven members of the Cali-
fornia Bar and two members of the New
York Bar appeared as amici curiae, repre-
senting such organizations as the Jewish
Welfare League and the Protestant Episco-
pal Bishop of California.
to the arbitrary nature of the town board's
determination.
In Matter of Community Synagogue v.
Bates, a zoning board had refused a permit
for the erection of buildings for religious
and educational purposes as well as the con-
comitant recreational and social uses. I.
remanding the case, the Court of Appeals
reversed the board's finding that the enu-
merated uses were not "strictly religious."
In deciding several other questions raised
on appeal, the Court rejected the conten-
tion that a distinction can be drawn between
the power to prohibit and the authority to
deny a church the right to build at a specfiic
location, reasoning that the latter would
amount to the power of declaring what is
the precise location for a church.
Both these cases will be treated more
extensively in a subsequent edition of THE
CATHOLIC LAWYER.-Ed.
